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This article examines Swedish, Danish and Norwegian governments’ participation in 
the European Return Platform for Unaccompanied Minors (ERPUM) project and its 
failed attempts to deport unaccompanied minors (UAMs) to Afghanistan. It argues that 
ERPUM is an interesting and urgent case of a “deportation corridor” and suggests that 
this framework can benefit from analysis through normative and applied ethics and in 
particular discussions of feasibility constraints. It therefore identifies and critically 
assesses two nationalistic arguments for deportation common in Nordic politics, based 
on appeals to credibility and humanitarianism. Considering the growth of nationalistic 
immigration policies in Nordic states, the article turns the usual discussion of feasibility 
on its head by showing that not only cosmopolitan, but also nationalistic ethics must 
face up to charges of lacking realism. More specifically, it argues that the case of ERPUM 
illustrates how nationalistic deportation ethics may rely on inconsistent normative and 
erroneous empirical assumptions, which can be criticized for their arbitrariness, 
ideological grounding and lack of feasibility. 
 
Keywords: deportation corridors, ERPUM, immigration ethics, feasibility, 
unaccompanied minors, Afghanistan 
 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, European countries have accelerated deportations to Afghanistan, for 
instance by the EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward-agreement (JWF 2016) that aims 
to deport at least 80 000 rejected Afghan asylum seekers. Several European countries, 
including Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway, have conducted deportations of 
adults to Afghanistan. In 2016, Norway was the European country with the highest 
number of forced returns. Between January and November 2016, Norway forcibly 
returned 278 Afghans, according to a Norwegian embassy attaché in Kabul (New 
York Times, 12.11.2016).  
In the context of a “deportation turn” in Western asylum politics (Gibney 2008), 
the article applies the concept of “deportation corridor” (Drotbohm and Hasselberg 
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. 
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2015: 553) to Nordic attempts to deport unaccompanied minors to Afghanistan. 
Swedish, Danish and Norwegian involvement in the 2011-2014 EU Commission-
funded project, ERPUM (European Return Platform for Unaccompanied Minors), is 
used as a case study.  
Focusing on the concrete processes of a deportation corridor, the article applies 
the notion of “feasibility constraints” and examines some arguments offered for 
Nordic deportation politics in general and ERPUM in particular. This turns on its 
head the usual manner in which the realism and idealism of asylum policies are 
discussed both in immigration ethics and political debates. Rather than asking about 
the feasibility of demanding cosmopolitan ethics, like open borders, the article directs 
our attention to the under-examined question of nationalistic ethics’ lacking 
feasibility. 
For simplicity, this article uses the legal category of “unaccompanied minors” 
(UAMs), but it must be noted that this categorization is contested and ambiguous. 
Age assessments are widely challenged as arbitrary (cf. Noll 2016), and they also 
create contradictions in the children's’ self-narration between the systemic age 
ascription based on statistical models and chronology, and a relational age-ascription 
based on their family relations (cf. Martinez 2017). It has also been pointed out that 
the challenges of lacking a social network and the vulnerability facing deportable 
youth are sometimes even heightened by the transition into adulthood, as “aged-out 
minors” no longer fall under states’ obligations under the Convention of the Rights 
of the Child (CRC) (Chase, Allsopp and Mitchell 2014).  
The following section outlines how the case study of ERPUM contributes to the 
Nordic literature on UAMs and deportation studies in general. The article then 
identifies a gap in the immigration ethics literature, namely how nationalistic 
deportation ideals have not been problematized in terms of their lacking feasibility in 
the real world. Next, two arguments for deportation are introduced, those of 
credibility and humanitarianism. These are principled nationalistic justifications, but 
they also feature in current Nordic discourses on the politics and bureaucracy of 
deportations. Noting that the liberal nationalistic ethics of David Miller do not engage 
with deportations or unaccompanied minors, the article nevertheless argues that such 
ethical views operate with (underexplored) assumptions about the feasibility of 
deportation politics. Accordingly, the discourses surrounding ERPUM are examined 
in order to critically assess the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments, with a 
particular focus on the underlying assumptions about the feasibility constraints they 
rely on. 
I now turn to situate ERPUM as a deportation corridor within the field of 
deportation studies. 
 
The ERPUM project as a “deportation corridor” 
Studies of Nordic states’ deportation infrastructures are dominated by government-
commissioned reports that assess the potential for assisted returns and deportations 
(cf. Danielsen and Seeberg 2006; Borhan et. al 2011; Lidén et al. 2013; ERPUM 2014). 
Some critical work is however emerging (see DeBono 2017; Plambech 2017), and by 
examining the attempted deportation corridor of ERPUM, this article further links 
Nordic literature on children in asylum systems with the field of “deportation studies” 
(Coutin 2015). 
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This emergent field offers many perspectives on deportation, ranging from 
genealogies of expulsion (Walters, 2002; Kanstroom, 2007); the relation between 
deportation and citizenship (Anderson, Gibney and Emanuela Paoletti, 2011); how 
immigration law produces “illegalities” and “deportability” (De Genova, 2002; De 
Genova and Peutz, 2010); the geopolitics and infrastructures underpinning 
deportation (Cassarino, 2014; Collyer, 2012); and what happens after deportation (cf. 
Schuster and Majidi 2015; Khosravi 2018). However, save for a few examples dealing 
with European policies, the international literature has not engaged with UAM-
deportations specifically (Fekete 2005, 2011; Lemberg-Pedersen 2015).  
For this reason, the article suggests “deportation corridors” (Drotbohm and 
Hasselberg 2014) as a useful analytical framework to combine these focus areas. It 
denotes how deportation politics are composed of dynamic and transnational 
processes and infrastructures; how these politics are continuously shaped through 
diplomacy and geopolitics; and how they have psychosocial and spatiotemporal 
consequences for potential deportees as well as for the communities that persons are 
deported from and to (Drotbohm and Hasselberg 2014; cf. Peutz 2006).  
ERPUM was the first EU project with the ambition to organize the administrative 
deportation of UAMs, and its ambitions have since then been transferred to the EU-
Afghanistan Joint Way Forward agreement (JWF 2016). By 2018, Nordic countries 
were key actors in the construction of ERPUM: Sweden coordinated the project, 
Denmark helped develop it, and Norwegian policies were used as a pilot model. The 
remaining participants were the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium. 
ERPUM planned for deportation corridors to Iraq, Morocco and Afghanistan, 
eventually singling out the latter. The EU Commission funded ERPUM's first phase 
from January 2011 (€692 775), and its second phase from December 2012 (€596 356). 
Amidst a resurgence of violence and bombings in Afghanistan, the project was 
discontinued in June 2014, without deporting a single UAM (Lemberg-Pedersen and 
Chatty 2015). ERPUM is therefore also an instructive case of a deportation corridor, 
because it failed. However, despite this, it also facilitated legal reforms aligned with 
the 2008 EU Returns Directive’s Article 10.2, in Norway (2009), Denmark (2010) and 
Sweden (2012).  
The notion of a deportation corridor is useful for analyzing ERPUM, as it expands 
our gaze beyond the actual event of return. It highlights how return relies on 
transnational and multilocal practices, varied geographies, and different actors and 
institutions (Drotbohm and Hasselberg 2015). It also covers the many experiences of 
deportation, from UAMs living in fear of deportation to events preceding and 
following the return, such as arrest, detention, return and existence thereafter. The 
deportation corridor analytics also encompass political economy and the 
infrastructures underpinning the policy, including the governments and national and 
international organizations and institutions involved (cf. Walters 2017).  
Grounded in Northern European civil servant networks striving for deportation 
corridors to Afghanistan, ERPUM combined five main components: asylum rejection 
– family tracing – deportation procedures – reception facilities – reintegration 
(ERPUM 2014; Lemberg-Pedersen 2015). For reasons of scope, this article focuses 
mostly on only the first three components, although all are mired in controversy.  
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Figure 1: Key developments in the preparation for the ERPUM-deportation 
corridor 2009-2010 (Lemberg-Pedersen 2015) 
 
The project’s idea of deportation orphanages in Afghanistan met with fierce 
criticism from the press and civil society actors. Save the Children Norway (2012) 
called it “experimenting with children’s lives,” and the Children’s Council and Save 
the Children submitted 25 critical questions to the Danish Minister of Justice Morten 
Bødskov (Børnerådet & Red Barnet 2012). An official from the Afghan Ministry of 
Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) was also extremely critical, saying, “We don’t 
support the repatriation of children because a lot of them left at an early age so we are 
not sure we can find their parents or relatives[…] They could fall into the hands of 
drug addicts, Taliban or criminal gangs.” (BBC Online 24 November 2011). 
The participating governments offered quite different perspectives on the kind of 
corridor they were pursuing, illustrating the corridor’s complexity. At some points, 
ERPUM officers argued that children could be forcibly returned, only to later reverse 
that statement. And while Belgian authorities provided public assurances against 
forced UAM-returns, instructions to the Swedish police and statements by Danish, 
Dutch, and Norwegian officials seemed to condone forceful deportations. At the end 
of the day, ERPUM was not the unifying platform its own discourses made it out to 
be. Instead, the participating countries seemed to use it to promote their national 
priorities. It is therefore more accurate to say that the supranational ERPUM pilot 
actually facilitated the multiplication of several distinct national deportation 
corridors. In the following, the focus is turned to the normative dimension of Nordic 
UAM-deportation corridors. 
 
Normative questions concerning feasibility in nationalistic 
ethics 
Deportation studies are still dominated by certain disciplines, and wanting for the 
potential contributions of others. One of these is immigration ethics, emerging in the 
1980s and 1990s with the central principled debate between the impartial and 
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cosmopolitan valuation of universal rights and the national-cultural valuation of 
particular societies (cf. Brown and Shue 1981; Walzer 1983; Beitz 1983; Carens 1987; 
Barry and Goodin 1992; Miller 1995). However, states’ enforcement of policies, 
including deportation politics, has remained a gap, also in relation to the plight of 
migrant children (cf. Sager 2017). Moreover, applied ethical analyses of Nordic 
asylum policies are lacking (see though Lemberg-Pedersen 2011; Svendsen 2012; 
Josefsson 2017), and few have ventured into deportation ethics (but see Cohen 1997; 
Gibney and Hansen 2003; Gibney 2008, 2013, 2015; Lenard 2015). 
This article applies ethical analysis to Nordic UAM-deportations through the 
notion of “feasibility constraints”. This is when facts are invoked to constrain a 
prescriptive conclusion, because they are seen as limiting the feasibility of courses of 
action otherwise recommended by a normative principle (Lægaard 2016: 13). The 
focus on feasibility follows the ambition of navigating “realistic utopias” between 
principled discussions of ideal theory and the challenge of non-ideal theory regarding 
partial compliance to principles in actual contexts (Rawls 1999). It reflects the idea 
that while any kind of justice relies on separating what is the case from what ought to 
be the case, justice is also constrained by the idea that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (Islar et al. 
2017; Wiens 2014).  
The question concerning feasibility revolves around the likelihood of 
implementing ideals and has received more attention from immigration ethics 
recently (Carens 1999, 2013; Pevnik 2011; Miller 2013; 2016; Bosniak 2017). Matthew 
Gibney (2004: 196) has pointed out that in ideal theory, the desirability of moral 
principles is often discussed independently of questions of agency. This approach is 
problematic as it leaves the question of implementation underdetermined. More 
precision is required to address the practical constraints faced by governments when 
they try to realize certain normative ideals through their policies. Gibney (2004) 
distinguishes between structural/institutional, political and ethical constraints.  
The first group of constraints encompasses limitations that are inimical to the 
function of states, such as the member/non-member-distinction, and poses certain 
constraints on what can be required from them. Gibney argues that the moral value 
of an ideal should not rely on a will to implement it, since ideal theory may also 
demand that states create radical new institutions capable of implementing more 
demanding ideals. The second group – the political constraints – have to do with 
factors like refugee determination processes, domestic political environment, 
including nationalist movements, job scarcity, housing policies, crime, and relations 
with other states. The third group – the ethical constraints – revolve around the 
implications of trying to implement certain ideals, for instance if an unintended side 
effect of their implementation is that general support for them erodes.  
Ethical discussions about feasibility often focus on agency and motivational power, 
linking this to the principled debate between cosmopolitans and nationalists, and the 
derived clash between proponents of open and closed borders (cf. Carens 1987; 
Abizadeh 2008; Miller 2010; Holtug 2011). The ethical nationalist David Miller also 
talks of feasibility constraints (cf. 2013), and despite at times labeling his view “liberal 
nationalism” (Miller 1995), he disagrees with Gibney about the balance between 
universal liberal ideals and motivation. He says that the social relations of the real 
world impose “feasibility constraints on the principles that can justifiably be 
advanced,” and that the reasons for accepting principles must come from “beliefs that 
people hold to begin with…rather than some imaginary world whose natural and 
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social laws are different from our own.” (Miller 2013: 4). This illustrates a general 
tendency with proponents of border controls, who depict themselves as realists 
rooted in the non-ideal world, while framing those arguing for universal ideals, 
including the rights of deportees, as disconnected from the actual motivations of 
people (cf. Miller 2007; Carens 2013; Gibney 2004). 
However, this framing is misleading. The global proliferation of anti-deportation 
campaigns and historical and current formations of institutions promoting equal and 
fundamental rights illustrate that cosmopolitan idealism also carries motivational 
power.  
Yet, the political pushbacks against such ideals should not be seen, as some have 
argued, as “a swan song to a vanishing ideology of nationhood” (Benhabib 2006: 65). 
Rather, nationalistic ideology and the associated understanding of feasibility in 
immigration ethics are on the rise. A stark example of this arose when the majority 
whip of the Danish Social Democratic opposition party, Henrik Sass Larsen, charged 
that:  
The utopian humanist idea of free immigration and global rights for refugees 
has led to a mass immigration that the Western countries’ economies and 
political and social structures cannot bear…People do not want to cancel the 
nation-state in favor of a Utopia. They like their state, their country, their 
language, their national identity…the era of the humanistic Utopia is 
over…The collapse is already underway, and the only reason why the humanist 
shouts are so loud is that they dominate the state media.” (Information 
1.4.2017, author's translation). 
The figure of the “utopian humanist”, who from his/her ideals espouses free 
immigration to the ruin of his/her own society, is similar to the kind of 
cosmopolitanism that David Miller criticizes with his ethical nationalism (cf. 1995, 
2005). However, as Sune Lægaard (2010) has remarked, it is “theoretically 
unsatisfactory and normatively implausible” when standard debates in immigration 
ethics end up with such stark dichotomies. One way of understanding this stalemate 
is to recognize its link to ideological battles. And without equating the stark 
comments of nationalistic politicians like Sass Larsen with the more nuanced liberal 
nationalism of Miller, an exploration of the latter’s arguments about feasibility and 
nationalistic ethics may assist us with this task.  
For Miller, the feasibility of ideals is derived from their ability to motivate 
individual action among ordinary citizens, something that he, like Sass Larsen, 
assumes cosmopolitanism to be incapable of. This means that the feasibility 
constraint is translated into a requirement that a moral theory should exhibit a close 
fit with pre-theoretical everyday judgments (Miller 2002: 6; Miller 2013: 34), referred 
to as motivational power being generated from within social circumstances. 
According to Miller, cosmopolitans commit the fallacy of “fact-independent 
theorizing” by implementing basic principles regardless of ordinary citizens’ social 
contexts (cf. Miller 1995: 5). He claims that normative theory must be developed out 
of and made to fit particular political settings (Miller 2016: 17; 2013: 45). This is 
related to Rawls’ conception of feasibility, as the stable implementation of principles 
over time that relies upon their connection to general facts about the human 
condition, including psychology (Rawls 1971: 158-61). At the meta-ethical level, then, 
Rawls and Miller hold that principles are fact-dependent, free from external “master 
 
Lemberg-Pedersen M. Etikk i praksis. Nord J Appl Ethics (2018), 12(2), 47–68 53 
principles” and generated from within particular contexts, such as national cultures 
(Miller 2002: 10). 
Cases certainly exist where cosmopolitan immigration ethics seem abstract and 
pressed in providing concrete guidelines. One example is the liberal dilemma of 
implementing free movement in contexts where states face secondary refugee 
movement following relocation and resettlement. Another is the question of whether 
states can ever be allowed to refuse protection to a person, if they have already 
admitted another person from circumstances of identical moral relevance. Some 
cosmopolitans have themselves acknowledged these difficulties with liberal theory. 
Carens (1999: 1082) has argued that they are caused by the exclusionary practices of 
self-professed liberal democratic states, while Cole (2000: 198) points to postcolonial 
problems with the roles of reason and universalism residing at the heart of liberal 
theory. However, it is not clear why nationalists should think they fare better than 
cosmopolitans with such hard cases, since nationalistic ethics is also in the business 
of arguing from principled values. Miller criticizes ideal theory, but it can be argued 
that his contextualism simply replaces an external master principle with an internal 
one from within political communities.1  
Even if Miller does not himself engage with the question of deportation and 
unaccompanied minors, the generative role he claims to grant facts illustrates the 
fundamental role that feasibility claims occupies for nationalistic ethics and politics. 
However, the relationship between nationalistic ideals and facts in deportation 
politics is more problematic than Miller assumes. The next section therefore unfolds 
a deeper inquiry into the relationships between different kinds of facts and two 
nationalistic justifications for the implementation of deportation corridors. 
 
Two arguments for deportations 
The credibility argument 
One argument for deportation corresponds to widely shared intuitions about the 
principled legitimacy and credibility of asylum systems, namely their ability to 
differentiate between those who are granted protection and those who are not 
(Gibney 2008) (hereafter, the credibility argument). If people are not granted 
protection, they must leave, and if they do not leave, the very idea of having a system 
that grants states the discretion to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate 
claimants in the first place becomes pointless. Therefore, deportation corridors are 
necessary to preserve a credible asylum system. This principled argumentation is 
common in Nordic politics and was invoked when the Social Democratic Secretary 
of State in Norway, Pål Lønseth, presented his government’s new deportation strategy 
for 2011-2016, saying, “We must give a clear signal that asylum is meant for people 
with protection needs. If you don’t have the right to protection, you must count on 
being deported…” (Vårt Land, April 11, 2012). A similar argumentation was found 
in the Government Platform document (2016) of the Danish Løkke-government. 
Under the label of a “balanced and realistic” immigration policy, it stated that “many 
rejected asylum seekers refuse to leave voluntarily and stay in the country. That 
undermines the legitimacy of the asylum system. That is why the government wants 
to strengthen the collaboration and dialogue with home countries about readmission 
of their own nationals…” 
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Moving from this principled point, we can apply the credibility argument to a 
concrete claim about Nordic asylum systems, namely that the inability to deport 
people leads to institutional backlogs. This variant can be called the cost claim, which 
claims that institutional backlogs of undeportable migrants force authorities to re-
allocate resources from other asylum claimants, as well as from legitimate refugees. 
This then constitutes a structural constraint, which allows states to override 
undeportables’ rights and dignity and place them in deportation corridors.  
Another variant of the credibility argument is the claim of racist backlash (Gibney 
2004: 212), in which state resources spent on undeportables leads to distrust and 
opposition to the very idea of an asylum system offering protection among voter 
segments in the receiving country. To avoid sacrificing the asylum system, the 
argument goes, states must be able to deport. This variant of the argument poses a 
political constraint on the rights of undeportables, perceived to arise when 
governments try to implement the ideal of protection, while also attempting to avoid 
feeding a backlash from racist voters unwilling to offer protection to refugees. The 
argumentation also links to nationalist-populist narratives of “asylum shoppers” and 
“abusers.”  
The credibility argument thus finds its intuitive force in structural and political 
constraints, which make implementing the ideal of refugee determination lengthy 
and costly. This might be thought to furnish governments “with a powerful argument 
to dampen criticism from those concerned with human rights” during deportations 
(c.f. Gibney 2008: 22). Yet, the argument faces serious objections, but before 
considering these, we must first turn to the second argument for Nordic deportation 
corridors. 
 
The humanitarian argument 
This argument invokes humanitarian justifications for deportations by putting 
forward structural, political and ethical constraints on the ideal that UAMs should be 
granted independent agency. The core claim is that swift deportations, even if forced, 
are the most humane option for rejected asylum seeking UAMs (hereafter the 
humanitarian argument). This illustrates how authorities vacillate between 
arguments of care and control (Walters 2011; Pallister-Wilkins 2015; Lemberg-
Pedersen 2018). 
Arguments about the humanity of UAM deportations come in several variants. 
One can be called the child rights variant. In its later stages, ERPUM (2014: 14) 
repeatedly argued that common-European collaboration on the quick and ordered 
return of UAMs to Afghanistan “promotes child rights dialogues in the EU” and even 
framed ERPUM as “a vital pillar for the protection of minors.” UAM deportations, it 
was claimed, avoid having children placed in the psychological limbo of camp life 
found to have devastating psychosocial consequences, such as restlessness, despair, 
fatigue, self-harm, mental breakdowns and desubjectification (Vitus 2010; Seglem, 
Oppedal and Raeder 2011; Lier, Jansson and Rich 2011; Montgomery 2011). 
Consequently, says the humanitarian argument, there are ethical side effects to 
implementing the ideal that UAMs can choose to reject deportation. If the ideal is to 
preserve UAMs’ rights and integrity, the psychosocial risks of camp life generate 
constraints so severe that the ideal becomes infeasible.  
A second and related variant of the humanitarian argument also dominated the 
later stages of ERPUM. This we can call the family unity variant, namely that family 
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tracing is a “key element to ensure family reunification and unity.” According to this 
line of argumentation, family tracing efforts solve the tragic situation of “broken and 
lost ties with the family and other relatives,” which is “a major cause of emotional 
ailment” among UAMs in Nordic asylum systems (ERPUM 2014: 20). Recent 
research discusses how these two variants of the humanitarian argument also feature 
in the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the best interest of the 
child and are used to justify not only the right to stay, but sometimes also child 
deportations (Josefsson 2016).  
A third variant of the humanitarian argument occurred in ERPUM's early stage 
(2010: 13). It claims that swift deportations will make children realize the futility of a 
journey to the Nordic countries, so that “those minors who are not in need of 
protection will not make the long and risky journey to Europe since the risk of being 
returned is higher.” We can call this the benevolent deterrence variant. This variant is 
common in Nordic deportation discourses and is sometimes also linked to the 
argument of credibility. This was illustrated in 2010, when Norwegian Social 
Democratic prime minister Jens Stoltenberg justified the 2011-2016 deportation 
strategy, arguing that “[s]wift returns will preempt the need for persons without 
protection needs to come to Norway, and that has great significance for the legitimacy 
of the institutions of asylum.” (VG Nyheter 10.5.2010). This argumentation is 
connected to debates during the 2000s among Norwegian and Swedish media and 
politicians concerning the multiple representations of UAMs as vulnerable children, 
strategizing migrants and independent rights holders (Stretmo 2014). 
These three variants of the humanitarian arguments all appeal to strong ethical 
ideals in their justifications, but each of them also faces problems. Before discussing 
these, we will first return to the credibility argument. 
 
Feasibility constraints on nationalistic deportation ethics 
Reassessing the credibility argument for deportation 
One problem with the credibility argument is that it assumes states’ asylum decisions 
to be fair. However, critics say that this assumption is problematized by states’ actual 
refugee determination practices. We may agree in principle that for protection 
systems to function, applicants must accept final decisions. But we may also hold that 
because authorities’ decisions can be arbitrary and immoral and are often reversed 
after media or grassroots pressure, it may be morally legitimate to refuse particular 
deportation decisions (Sager 2017; see also Johannesson, 2017; Wettergren and 
Wikström 2013). Even if this undermines the ideal of a differentiating protection 
system, the imperfect implementation of that ideal can create gross injustices that 
need to be rectified. 
What we can call the charge of arbitrariness is compatible with accepting that 
liberal democratic states have discretion over their own borders (cf. Gibney 2008: 153; 
Lenard 2015: 465). Deriving from neo-Republican ideals, this concept ventures that 
bureaucratic discretion is morally wrong when it is arbitrary and lacks legal 
democratic checks and balances that would allow those affected to contest and 
reshape it according to an ideal of nondomination (cf. Larmore 2003). Deportation 
corridors can be criticized for unfair domination, but arbitrariness may also be caused 
by a lack of time, rises in numbers or inadequate funds. Either way, the charge points 
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out that such factors constitute political, structural and ethical constraints on the ideal 
assumed by Nordic politicians of a differentiating and deporting system of protection. 
Consider, for instance, the massive differences between Northern European states’ 
recognition rates for Afghan asylum seekers. Between January and June 2015, the EU-
wide recognition rate for Afghan asylum seekers was 68.2%, but in Denmark it was 
34.7% and 69.7% in Germany, 76.6% in Sweden and 83.6% in Norway (Refugees.dk 
website). Since Denmark, Germany, Sweden and Norway all work from the 1951 
Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, these huge differences illustrate 
arbitrariness not only in asylum but also in deportation decisions, because national 
authorities´ low recognition rate of asylum seekers leads to deportation procedures.  
A tragic Danish example of arbitrariness occurred in the fall of 2015 when Danish 
authorities enforced a return decision to Afghanistan of the brothers Vahid and 
Abolfazi Vazari. They had voiced fears on national TV that their lives would be in 
danger if they were returned. The Danish authorities departed from institutional 
guidelines and assigned the older brother as the legal guardian of his minor brother. 
When the former reached adulthood, Danish authorities effectuated the deportation 
of them both, arguing that the older brother could now function as the adult guardian 
of the younger brother after the deportation, and that the two brothers could 
consequently be safely returned. Immediately upon arriving in Kabul, however, the 
two brothers got separated from each other. Later, the younger brother, Abolfazi, was 
allegedly found dead, while Vahid became homeless on the streets of Kabul. Later that 
year, an independent investigation found that the Danish police had acted wrongly 
when incarcerating the brothers before their return. Alongside his brother, Abolfazi 
was therefore granted compensation posthumously (Politiken 12.19.2015). In a 
Norwegian case, the boy Waziri was deported to Afghanistan, despite the fact that a 
local court had judged his age to be 16 four days earlier. Yet that decision was 
overturned by the Norwegian Immigration Appeals Board in the course of just two 
hours. It found him to be 18 years old – and thus deportable (Klassekampen 
8.12.2016). 
While the case of the Vazari brothers is uniquely tragic, there are many other 
examples of arbitrary and wrongful decisions in the Nordic deportation corridors. 
The credibility argument assumes that the cause of such arbitrariness is the failure of 
undeportables to comply with return decisions. Moreover, the cost and racist 
backlash variants also assume that governments are in fact trying to respect or optimize 
universal protection components of asylum systems. Yet the spread of nationalistic 
politics in Nordic states raises the question whether Nordic deportation policies are 
sometimes motivated by ideals other than universal rights and dignity. What we can 
call the charge of ideology points out that some governments may also be trying to 
dismantle these components. This turns the prevailing focus on feasibility on its head, 
since the bigger threat to the credibility of asylum systems may then not stem from 
undeportables, but from governments’ and bureaucracies’ rollback of protection 
ideals. In such cases, while the factual premise that asylum systems face credibility 
gaps may be true, it will be so for the wrong reason, namely a rollback of rights, checks 
and balances that contradicts the stated normative ideal of the credibility argument. 
To conclude, the original intuition that deportations may be legitimate, since they 
allow states to enforce differentiation between those who have protection needs and 
those who do not, remains strong. Yet, observing actual deportation corridors, it is 
clear that the credibility argument proceeds too quickly when claiming that this 
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principled point can override the serious concerns of arbitrariness, tragic 
enforcement and ideological interference. Even if the credibility argument for 
deportations is accepted in principle, we might still find actual deportation corridors, 
their actors, practices and sequence of events so ethically problematic that constraints 
are placed on the intuition of state discretion. Turning now to the humanitarian 
argument for deportations, we find that it too faces serious feasibility constraints.  
 
Reassessing the humanitarian argument for deportation 
The variants of humanitarian argumentation are used widely in Nordic and Western 
asylum politics and exemplify the advent of a “new humanitarianism.” According to 
B.S. Chimni (2000: 255), this means that human rights discourses are placed “in the 
service of a policy of containment,” thereby obscuring how “the Northern 
commitment to humanitarianism coexists with a range of practices which have for 
their objective its violation.” (Chimni 2000: 251; on “humanitarian border control,” 
see also Fassin 2012; Ticktin 2016). Such co-option poses a serious and general 
problem for variants of the argument. 
But the first variant of the argument, the child’s rights claim, also faces the more 
specific problem that its empirical assumptions about conditions for children in 
Afghanistan are erroneous. Notably, Nordic efforts to justify the deportation corridor 
by reference to the rights of the child have intensified at the same time as these 
conditions have deteriorated massively. Thus, in 2013, Afghanistan hosted a 
population of 631 286 internally displaced persons (IDPs) while 2.6 million refugees 
remained outside the country (UNHCR 2014). The number of IDPs is the highest in 
years, reflecting a spread of displacement to new provinces. Assessments of 
displacement illustrate this as the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has 
risen from 276 000 in 2009 to over one million in 2016 (UNHCR 2016). This amounts 
to dangerous conditions for children, and during 2012 the United Nations Assistance 
Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), reported 1302 casualties among Afghan boys and 
girls (488 deaths and 814 injured). Of 208 civil incidents with explosive remnants of 
war (ERW), 160 happened to children carrying out daily activities, and the majority 
of these casualties occurred from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and ground 
engagement between armed forces (UNAMA Statistics 2012). Also, the number of 
women and girls killed and injured from incidents of drone strikes more than tripled 
between 2011 and 2012, from 16 to 51 casualties. Illustrating the massive difficulties 
of creating prospects of development for children, 2012 also witnessed 74 attacks on 
education facilities, including the burning of schools. 
Another risk for children is forced recruitment, often named by UAMs as a prime 
emigration motivation. For instance, a 17-year old Hazara boy, who fled Afghanistan 
in 2008, told UNHCR interviewers in Sweden: “The Taliban wanted us to conduct 
war together with them. We realized there was no way out… it was not only me, but 
children in my age living in this area. We did not want to join, so after the Taliban 
had threatened me twice, my father sent me to Iran” (UNHCR 2010: 23). During 
2012, a report from The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
for Children and Armed Conflict (2013) noted 66 cases of recruitment, often with 
multiple victims, including some cases of 8-year old boys. Children forcibly recruited 
were used as guards and scouts to carry out attacks and to plant or set off IEDs.  
Given these statistics, the child’s rights claim unravels quickly, for the actual 
conditions in Afghanistan turn out to be much worse than even the psychosocial 
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limbo for undeportables in the Nordic countries. The many reports about the plight 
of Afghan children have constituted massive barriers to the construction of UAM 
deportation corridors to Afghanistan. Ethically speaking, they pose clear structural, 
political and ethical feasibility constraints on all variants of the credibility and the 
humanitarian arguments, when these assume deportations to be child friendly.  
The second variant of the humanitarian argument is the family unity claim that 
promises a link between the deportation corridor and family tracing, effectively 
framing Nordic deportation corridors as family reunification. In a peculiar twist, this 
variant of the argument then depicts the child’s emigration from Afghanistan as an 
ethical constraint on the same child’s right to family unity. In so doing, this claim 
effectively subordinates the child’s independence under an identity as part of a family. 
This denial of the child as an individual rights holder in the ERPUM discourses is a 
recurring practice in Nordic asylum authorities (cf. Stern 2015; Josefsson 2016), 
which exhibit a tendency to disregard UAMs' voice and agency about their own 
futures and the structural barriers they face (Hedlund and Cederborg 2015; 
Keselman, Cederborg, and Linell 2010). 
As noted above, the multiple threats to children and civilians in Afghanistan also 
problematize this claim, as does the fact that many UAMs and their families have not 
lived in the country for years, having instead been displaced to Iran and Pakistan (cf. 
Schuster and Majidi 2015). In recent years, these two countries have begun to conduct 
massive deportation sweeps back to Afghanistan citing “protection fatigue.” In 2016, 
according to the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR), an estimated 
one million people were forcibly returned to Afghanistan. More than 410 000 people 
returned from Iran between July and December 2016, and around 253 000 refugees 
were forcibly returned from Pakistan during the same year. This has led to an even 
more volatile and tumultuous situation for displaced Afghanis in all three countries 
(Majidi 2017: 4, 8-9). As we shall see next, this does not bode well for the optimistic 
visions that tracing can turn UAM deportations into tools of family reunification. 
Conditions in Afghanistan have problematized family tracing for a long time. 
Indeed, ERPUM's optimism was hard to comprehend given the history of Northern 
European family tracing in the decade before the project’s launch in 2011. In 2006 the 
Norwegian Immigration Service, UDI, commissioned a report to gain an overview of 
European attempts to trace the families of UAMs (Danielsen and Seeberg 2006). It 
compared the tracing experiences of nine European countries and showed that no 
countries had developed successful tracing methods. The report also revealed the 
existence of very different practices of data collection: Finland had launched a tracing 
project in 2006, but was unable to provide any information about its success rate; 
Denmark had no successful examples of family tracing after 2003. Even when 
authorities claimed success, they were unable to give exact numbers. Between 2001 
and 2005, the Norwegian UDI claimed to have traced family members of “either 10 
or 12” UAMs, and to have returned “between one and five” UAMs to families or 
caretakers. And Swedish authorities were unable to tell exactly how many tracings 
had been initiated in 2006, settling on a number “between 10 and 15” (Danielsen and 
Seeberg 2006: 26-39). The report showed numerous difficulties with family tracing in 
war-torn countries, such as insecurity, fragmented infrastructures, corrupt 
authorities, internal displacement and population movement and contexts of 
emigration and re-migration. The report also highlighted an absence of best practices 
of tracing and for independent post-deportation monitoring. 
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ERPUM was proud to announce tracing workshops in Stockholm, London, 
Utrecht and Oslo during 2013 and 2014, but the same difficulties quickly and 
predictably resurfaced, as the Afghan security situation had continued to deteriorate, 
adding further strain to postal and communications networks. This effectively left the 
ERPUM governments’ embassies as the only viable tracing options, but failing 
resources and logistics hampered their activities. Initially, at the beginning of the 
project, ERPUM placed high hopes on collaborating with the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), but the organization quickly expressed serious 
reservations concerning the lack of child-specific safeguards (Lemberg-Pedersen 
2015). In 2013, the organization withdrew from ERPUM altogether. In January 2014, 
the local tracing staff under the Identity Checking Unit (IDCU) did the same, citing 
security reasons. In its final report before the project was discontinued, ERPUM 
characterized its own tracing efforts as “reasonably successful.” Yet, the fact remains 
that only 34 out of 148 Afghan families were eventually traced and no children were 
returned to their families. Of the 34 cases, one family was deceased, while 14 families 
had their identity confirmed but could not be located. In 75 cases, the tracing efforts 
yielded no results whatsoever (ERPUM 2014: 41). 
The case of ERPUM's failed family tracing illustrates that the humanitarian 
argument for deportation faces devastating structural/institutional and political 
feasibility constraints. Even if we, for the sake of argument, assume that deportations 
were intended to promote family unity, the argument is undermined by the reality of 
family tracing in conflict-ridden or otherwise collapsing societal contexts, such as 
Afghanistan. Still, arguments based on the ideal of family reunification continue to 
dominate Nordic deportation politics. One reason for this could be that this narrative 
is linked to a culturalist thesis concerning the value of national belonging, thus 
portraying deportation as a return “home” to the national cultural family. The notion 
of return is thus derived from idealized assumptions, which understand communities 
and social life from within a national order of things (Malkki 1995). Deportation 
corridors are thus seen as processes of national resituation and as with the claim of 
family unity, this nationalistic argument also subsumes the rights of the individual to 
that of the larger, now national, family. Evidently, the resituation thesis aligns 
strongly with key points of nationalistic ethics. Next, we consider what such a 
normative outlook means for the connection between authorities’ feasibility claims 
and their own motivations.  
 
Benevolent deterrence and the kidnapper’s argument 
The third and last variant of the humanitarian argument, that of benevolent 
deterrence, claimed that the existence of deportation corridors will make child 
migrants choose not to come to Europe. This logic is mirrored by the early ERPUM 
discourses, in which the project’s 2010 grant proposal to the European Commission, 
authored by the Swedish Migration Agency, focused on the goal of a “lowering influx 
of unaccompanied minors to Europe.” This was seen as achievable because “those 
minors who are not in need of protection will not make the long and risky journey to 
Europe since the risk of being returned is higher.” (ERPUM 2010: 13-15). The project 
was in fact conceived of as a UAM deterrence tool, illustrating that despite the 
humanitarian arguments made, ERPUM was always intended as a “return platform” 
and not a “child protection platform” (Lemberg-Pedersen 2015). Its entire focus 
revolved around deportation, and the project exhibited no interest in other crucial 
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issues, like the emotional impact of flight trauma and anxiety for UAMs, or of their 
attempts to make sense of home and belonging in Nordic contexts characterized by 
processes of social exclusion (Wernesjö 2015). Furthermore, the deterrence rationale 
also reveals the existence of fundamental feasibility constraints facing this kind of 
humanitarian argumentation.  
Some of the reasons for the trauma of UAM undeportables may seem unavoidable, 
because they have to do with the very nature of irregular escape from violent conflict 
zones, separation from family and the uncertainty in asylum systems. However, other 
reasons for trauma are not unavoidable, and across the Nordic countries, political 
actors have justified several such conditions for deportables with reference to 
deterrence logic. This means that some of the assumptions invoked by the 
humanitarian argument should be considered contestable feasibility claims.  
We can invoke two conceptual distinctions to better understand this. The first 
distinguishes between subjective and objective feasibility claims (Cohen 1992). 
Subjective claims denote situations when an ideal that lacks realism depends on the 
intentions of moral agents, while objective claims encompass situations where the 
lack of realism is caused by factors beyond their control. What this tells us is that we 
need to ask for the reasons why an ideal is infeasible, and whether these have to do 
with the lack of will of those implementing it. Cohen (1992: 278) has pointed out that 
subjective claims of strong ethical constraints on ideals can work like a kidnapper’s 
argument, in the context of the humanitarian argument, means that critics can argue 
that the psychosocial trauma of undeportable children is actually not an objective 
feasibility constraint on the ideal of UAM rights and dignity. Rather, it is a subjective 
constraint, because the children’s traumatizing conditions result from states' 
intentions to deter future arrivals by lowering the living standards of undeportables 
and speed up their removal.  
The second conceptual distinction is between strong and weak feasibility 
constraints (Lægaard 2008). Strong constraints make ideals impossible to implement 
or uphold, and are thus akin to Cohen’s notion of objective constraints, while weak 
constraints mean that ideals may be morally costly to implement. This notion of 
moral costs is then similar to Gibney’s ethical constraints, as it also implies the 
weighing of normative ideals against the ethical side effects of their own 
implementation. For instance, the ideal of family and national reunification 
exemplify a nationalistic ideal facing strong structural and political feasibility 
constraints, because tracing and deportation is often not possible in war-torn 
countries ravaged by massive internal displacement. When it comes to weak 
feasibility constraints, an example would be the political decision to implement and 
uphold a non-arbitrary asylum system, because its moral value outweighs its side 
effects, such as the creation of undeportables and racist backlash.  
When politicians or governments depict controversial policy choices as 
predetermined by strong feasibility constraints, it is crucial to pay attention to how 
such claims assume certain motivational and empirical preconditions (Lægaard 
2006). And in the case of ERPUM, the benevolent deterrence claim withers away 
when one realizes that the psychosocial consequences of the deportation corridor are 
not a necessary background condition, but in fact result from governments’ choices 
to use detrimental humanitarian conditions to induce people to leave and deter others 
from arriving. 
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Conclusion 
This article has examined Nordic “deportation corridors” through a case study of the 
European Return Platform for Unaccompanied Minors (ERPUM), which Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway participated in from 2011 to 2014. The notion of feasibility 
constraints was used to critically assess the realism and idealism of deportations, a 
perspective currently overlooked in the emerging field of deportation studies. Also, 
departing from most discussions in immigration ethics, this article examined 
feasibility constraints not as realistic barriers to the lofty ideals of cosmopolitan open 
borders, but instead turned this perspective on its head, and discussed 
structural/institutional, political and ethical feasibility constraints on nationalistic 
arguments for the deportation of unaccompanied minors to Afghanistan. 
Two main arguments for deportation were introduced, labeled the credibility and 
the humanitarian arguments. The credibility argument rested on the powerful, 
principled intuition that asylum systems must be capable of using deportation to 
enforce the line between those who are in need of protection and those who are not. 
Its variants included feasibility claims about costs and the risk of racist backlash. Yet, 
observation of the actual enforcement of deportation corridors opened the argument 
to charges of arbitrariness and ideology. The charge of arbitrariness shows that even 
if we grant that states’ discretion over their borders is legitimate, the credibility 
argument can be insufficient to override the rights and dignity of deportation targets 
in concrete cases. And the charge of ideology further revealed that the argument’s 
empirical premise of a lack of credibility might be right for the wrong reasons. If the 
premise is actually caused by states’ nationalistic rollback of asylum seekers’ universal 
rights, that would contradict the argument’s own normative premise of protection. 
Like the credibility argument, the humanitarian argument advanced a mix of 
feasibility constraints, expressed in variants concerning the rights of the child, family 
unity and benevolent deterrence, all of which were identified in ERPUM discourses. 
However, appeals to “new humanitarianism” quickly encountered massive feasibility 
challenges of their own due to conditions in Afghanistan. The dangerous and 
deteriorating conditions for children and civilians in general in Afghanistan includes 
risks of forced recruitment, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and drone strikes. 
In a similar manner, the Afghan context of internal and external displacement, and 
Iranian and Pakistani mass deportations, illustrated that the many ERPUM 
workshops that promised family tracing were a politically convenient mirages 
without any foothold in reality. The continuing emphasis on reunification is also 
connected to an ideal of resituating the child into the national family, which, much 
like the ERPUM's framing of its deportation corridor as a tool for family 
reunification, bypasses the child as an independent rights holder. A core problem 
facing both the credibility and humanitarian arguments is their depiction of 
subjective feasibility claims, which rely on actors’ intentions and political will, as a 
strong and objective feasibility constraint on what is politically and ethically possible. 
And in cases where the justifying reasons for the terrible conditions of undeportables 
are actually found in the partial compliance and lack of will of the deporting actors 
themselves, a logic similar to a “kidnapper’s argument” is evident. 
In Miller’s view, feasibility constraints concerning the (lack of) political and 
popular support for ideals can be resolved through reasoned discussion and 
deliberation. But surely, this grants reason too much primacy and omits how ideology 
may not only influence our view on norms, but also of facts. As Joseph Carens stated 
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(1999: 1086): “…it is probably fair to say that people sometimes disagree about what 
the real world is as much as (if not more than) they disagree about what a just world 
would look like.” Similarly, discussions about Nordic deportation politics reflect 
divisions not merely over policies and their normative values, but also ideological 
ones spanning complex structural/institutional, political and juridical contexts.  
Given the intensity of ideological divisions, it is problematic that Miller and 
nationalistic ethics present his substantive ethical conclusions about border controls 
“as if they issue relatively unproblematically from the encounter between people’s 
everyday moral judgments and the philosopher’s ‘due reflection’ process.” (Bosniak 
2017: 8). Rather, the actual evolution of Nordic deportation politics – through 
controversies, fierce debates and anti-deportation campaigns – demonstrates that 
“our normative contexts are…riven scenes of self-wrestling and embattlement” 
(Bosniak 2017: 8). Miller claims that his contextualism is pluralistic because it can say 
something substantial about normative pluralism between contexts. Yet, 
characteristic of the homogenizing move of nationalistic ideology, his contextualism 
appears silent when it comes to normative discordance within national contexts. 
Miller’s assumption that rational deliberation will be able to settle such disagreements 
therefore repeats the overestimation of reason that he himself accuses cosmopolitans 
of. At the same time, it grossly underestimates how powerful ideology is in shaping 
people's world views.  
The combination of ideological struggles and the multiple feasibility constraints 
facing the two arguments for deportation constitutes a powerful critique of 
nationalistic deportation ethics in general, and of the attempts to construct 
deportation corridors for unaccompanied Afghan minors in particular. And so, while 
concerns about the feasibility of cosmopolitan immigration ethics are legitimate, 
cosmopolitanism is not the only view that has to face up to reality. For too long, 
nationalistic idealism and politics have not been asked to confront this kind of 
criticism, illustrated by the fact that, while David Miller has a lot to say about the 
principled legitimacy of border control, he says nothing about the enforcement of 
deportations towards vulnerable groups like unaccompanied minors (Bosniak 2017: 
11).  
At the end of the day, Miller’s critique of cosmopolitanism relied on the everyday, 
pre-theoretical and motivational power of ordinary citizens that he assumes to be the 
strength of nationalistic theories. However, it is not clear that motivational power is 
exclusive to nationalistic ethics. Even putting aside Cohen’s worry that meta-ethical 
fact dependency allows biases to delimit normative ideals, Miller’s view, by any 
measure, must grant feasibility crucial weight.  
But motivation is but one possible feasibility constraint on normative ideals. As 
Gibney points out, other crucial constraints turn on whether arguments’ empirical 
assumptions correspond to the structural, political and ethical contexts where ideals 
are to be implemented. The case of ERPUM shows that nationalistic deportation 
ethics can fare poorly against such constraints. For all its emphasis on facts, 
nationalistic ethics seems to disregard crucial questions concerning 
institutional/structural and political ethical feasibility. It thereby leaves the issue of 
implementation underdetermined and seems to end up with the implausible view 
that the feasibility of ideals dictating UAM deportations need only be justified by 
referring to the pre-theoretical opinions and motivations of Nordic citizens, and not 
by any reference to the actual causes, choices, conditions and hazards of children in 
 
Lemberg-Pedersen M. Etikk i praksis. Nord J Appl Ethics (2018), 12(2), 47–68 63 
Nordic deportation corridors or Afghanistan. Considering that nationalistic ethics is 
brandished as factually based, and that it criticizes cosmopolitanism of lofty 
abstractions, this is a damning critique. The arguments for the ongoing Nordic 
attempts to build UAM deportation corridors to Afghanistan seem to amount to 
“fact-independent theorizing” that are based on some “imaginary world whose 
natural and social laws are different” from reality. 
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Notes 
1 It has been argued that Miller’s and Rawls’ meta-ethical position conflates what is 
actually a distinction between basic principles and principles of regulation. Here, the 
former are normative ideals we choose to strive for, and the latter are the “devices for 
having certain effects” best suited to implement those ideals (Cohen 2003: 241). Only 
the latter takes into account feasibility concerns other than those concerned with 
motivation. Cohen’s point is to avoid letting status quo biases determine the 
formulation of principles of justice, and it can be argued that this is exactly what 
happens when Miller allows the “sedentary bias” (Bakewell 2008) of nationalism to 
grant ethical priority to national compatriots over outsiders (Cole 2000). 
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